We show that every sequential screening model is equivalent to a standard text book static screening model. We use this result and apply well-established techniques from static screening to obtain solutions for classes of sequential screening models for which standard sequential screening techniques are not applicable. Moreover, we identify the counterparts of wellunderstood features of the static screening model in the corresponding sequential screening model such as the single-crossing condition and conditions that imply the optimality of deterministic schedules.
Sequential versus Static Screening

The sequential screening problem
This subsection considers the sequential screening model of Courty and Li (2000) . There is a buyer (the agent, he) and a seller (the principal, she), who has a single unit of a good for sale.
The buyer's valuation of the good is x ∈ [0, 1], and the seller's opportunity costs are c ≥ 0. The terms of trade specify the probability q ∈ [0, 1] with which the good is exchanged and an expected payment t ∈ from the buyer to the seller. The parties are risk neutral and have quasi-linear utility functions. That is, the seller's profit equals payments minus her expected opportunity costs, t − cq, and the buyer's utility equals his expected valuation minus payments, xq − t. Each party's reservation utility is normalized to 0.
There are three periods. At the contracting stage in period 1, no party knows the buyer's true valuation, but the buyer privately knows that his valuation x is distributed according to the distribution function G(x|θ ) on the support [0, 1] with density g (x|θ ) . While the buyer's ex ante type θ is his private information, it is commonly known that θ is drawn from the distribution F (θ ) with support [0, 1] and density f (θ ). In period 2, after the buyer has accepted the contract, the buyer privately observes his true valuation x. We refer to x as the buyer's ex post type. Finally, in period 3, the contract is implemented. We allow the seller's opportunity costs c = c(θ , x) to depend on the buyer's types. 3 The seller's problem is to design a contract that maximizes her expected profits. By the revelation principle for sequential games (e.g., Myerson 1986) , the optimal contract can be found in the class of direct and incentive compatible contracts which, on the equilibrium path, induce the buyer to report his type truthfully. Formally, a direct contract
requires the buyer to report an ex ante type θ in period 1, and an ex post type x in period 2. A contract commits the seller to a selling schedule q d (θ ,x) and a transfer schedule t d (θ ,x) .
If the buyer's true ex post type is x and his period 1 report wasθ , then his utility from reporting x in period 2 isũ
We denote the buyer's period 2 utility from truth-telling by u(θ , x) ≡ũ(x|θ , x).
The contract is incentive compatible in period 2 if it gives the buyer an incentive to announce his ex post type truthfully:
If the contract is incentive compatible in period 2, the buyer announces his ex post type truthfully no matter what his report in the first period. 4 Hence, if the buyer's true ex ante type is θ , then his period 1 utility from reportingθ is
We denote the buyer's period 1 utility from truth-telling by
The contract is incentive compatible in period 1 if it induces the buyer to announce his ex ante type truthfully:
Finally, an incentive compatible contract is ex ante individually rational if it yields the buyer at least his outside option of zero:
We say a contract is feasible if it is incentive compatible in both periods and ex ante individually rational.
The following lemma is a standard result in monopolistic screening, and we therefore omit the proof.
Lemma 1 A contract γ d satisfies the period 2 incentive compatibility constraints (4) if and only if (i)
for almost all x.
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Since u is absolutely continuous in x, we may use integration by parts to rewrite the agent's period 1 utility as
The seller's payoff from a feasible contract is the difference between aggregate surplus and the buyer's utility. That is, if the buyer's ex ante type is θ , the seller's conditional expected payoff, conditional on θ , is
Using (9), we can rewrite the seller's payoff as
To present our equivalence result with maximum clarity, we will, without loss of generality, impose the conditions q d (θ , 0) = 0 and q d (θ , 1) = 1. 6 The seller's problem is therefore to find a selling schedule q d and utility levels u(·, 0) for the buyer's lowest ex post type that solves the following maximization problem:
A general static screening problem
We now specify a general static screening problem that is based on the formulation in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), but explicitly allows for stochastic contracts. In particular, we consider a principal and a privately informed agent who can trade some quantity x ∈ [0, 1]. An allocation specifies a, possibly stochastic, quantity x to be traded and a transfer t ∈ from the agent to the principal. Before the principal offers a contract, the agent privately learns his type θ ∈ [0, 1], which is drawn from a distribution F (θ ) with support [0, 1] and density f (θ ). Given a type θ and an allocation (x, t), the principal's utility is S(θ , x) + t, and the agent's utility is V (θ , x) − t.
Hence, as in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) , our specification allows for arbitrary quasi-linear utility functions, including the interdependent value case where the principal's utility depends directly on the agent's type.
Applying the revelation principle, the principal offers the agent a direct contract
We explicitly allow the principal to propose a contract with a stochastic quantity schedule. Hence,
represents a cumulative distribution function (cdf) with the interpretation that, if the agent reports θ , then the probability that the quantity traded is at most x is q s (θ , x). Consequently, q s (θ , x) is positive and increasing in x. Moreover, without loss of generality, we impose the restrictions q s (θ , 0) = 0 and q s (θ , 1) = 1. 7 The expected utility from a contract γ s for agent type θ who reportsθ therefore corresponds to the (Riemann-Stieltjes) integral with respect to the
We denote agent type θ 's expected utility from truth-telling by
7 Note that in case q s has a mass point at x = 0, this departs from the convention that a cdf is right-continuous. A contract is feasible if it is incentive compatible, that is,
and individually rational, that is,
The principal's expected utility from a feasible contract is
Consequently, an optimal contract (q s , t s ) in the static principal agent problem solves
where the first constraint expresses the fact that q
Equivalence result
We now formalize the sense in which both models are equivalent. We first argue that any sequential screening model with primitives G and c corresponds to a static screening problem with appropriately defined primitives V and S. Before stating this result, note that (12) and (19) imply that any selling schedule q d in the sequential model corresponds to a stochastic trading schedule in the static model. Therefore, for t s (·) = −u(·, 0), the choice variables in the two problems d and s are the same. As we now show, there are functions V and S so that also the parties' payoffs are the same.
Proof of Proposition 1: We show that for t s (θ ) = −u(·, 0), and for V and S defined in (20) and
This implies that s and d are equivalent and thus the solutions coincide.
To see (22), observe that
Hence, we can write (9) as a Riemann-Stieltjes integral with respect to V :
Applying integration by parts for Riemann-Stieltjes integrals, we obtaiñ
where in the second line, we have used that V (θ , 1) = 0 and q d (θ , 0) = 0, and in the third line we have used the definitions of q s (θ , x) and t s (θ ) in the statement of the proposition.
The main argument behind Proposition 1 can be most easily seen when q d is a step function as illustrated in Figure 1 . In this case, the agent's expected utility (9) in the sequential model for given (θ ,θ ) rewrites as
The three integrals are illustrated in the left panel of Figure 1 . Instead of integrating along d x,
we can as well integrate along dq, as illustrated in the right panel of Figure 1 . Then the previous expression can be written as (20) and t s (θ ) = −u(θ , 0), this equals the agent's expected utilitỹ (14) 
Proof of Proposition 2: Observe first that G(x|θ ) as defined in (32) is a cumulative distribution function by the properties in (31). Next, the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 1 imply that the solutions coincide if the equations (20) and (21) hold, which follow from (32) and (33) by re-arranging terms and integration. Q.E.D.
8 Without imposing these conditions on V , we still obtain the insight that any static screening problem that allows for stochastic selling schedules q corresponds to a linear optimization problem (linear with respect to q) of the type d with linear constraints, where G is not necessarily a cdf. Such problems are, e.g., considered in Samuelson (1984) .
Remark 1 While our transformation of the sequential screening model yields a static screening problem that is fully consistent with a stochastic formulation of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) , its economic interpretation is somewhat non-standard. The agent's utility function (20) has the property that
In other words, the agent derives positive utility when the traded quantity is x = 0, and his utility is decreasing in x. Thus, in contrast to the original sequential screening model, where x represents the agent's valuation as a buyer and his utility is naturally increasing in x, in the static counterpart, the agent is best interpreted as a producer who has costs V (θ , 0)−V (θ , x) to produce the quantity x and obtains a positive utility V (θ , 0) from being in the relation per se (e.g., in the form of "prestige").
Turning to the principal, we first observe from (21) that the principal's utility S(θ , x) depends directly on the agent's type θ , since it includes the distribution G(·|θ ) explicitly. Hence, even if the original sequential screening problem is one of private values where c is independent of the agent's type θ , its corresponding static version displays interdependent values.
Moreover, for the typical case that the principal's marginal production costs c in the sequential model are type-independent (i.e., c(θ , x) = c), the principal's marginal utility in the corresponding static screening model is
If the hazard rate (1 − G(x|θ ))/g(x|θ ) is decreasing in x, this means that the principal's utility function S(θ , x) is hump-shaped: it is increasing in x on [0,x(θ )] and decreasing in x on (x(θ ), 1], wherex(θ ) ∈ (0, 1) is the intersection point of x − c with the hazard rate. While somewhat unusual for a static screening problem, this can be interpreted to mean that the principal has horizontally differentiated tastes, and in state θ , his most preferred "variety" isx(θ ).
Application of the equivalence result
In this section, we apply our equivalence result and show how solution methods from the theory of static screening allow us to solve sequential screening problems to which current approaches in the literature are not directly applicable.
A standard technique in static screening is the so-called local approach which solves a relaxed problem where only "local" incentive constraints are imposed. Under appropriate conditions, the solution to the relaxed problem can then be shown to be a solution of the original problem.
More precisely, the local approach simplifies the static screening problem s by (a) replacing the global incentive constraint U s (θ ) ≥Ũ s (θ |θ ) for all θ ,θ by the local incentive constraints ∂ U s (θ |θ )/∂θ = 0, which, by an envelope argument pins down the agent's marginal utility as
and (b) by imposing the participation constraints U s (θ ) ≥ 0 for all θ only for the extreme type
After inserting the incentive and the participation constraints in the principal's objective, we obtain the problem s : max
where
is the (static) virtual surplus. The solution to s is given by the degenerate distribution which places all mass on the point-wise maximizer of Z:
We may write the associated distribution function as
where 1 A (x) expresses the indicator function, which equals 1 if x ∈ A and 0 otherwise.
Following this approach and explicitly allowing for stochastic contracts, Strausz (2006) 
Condition (i) is the familiar single-crossing condition. 10 It is well-known that if x s R (θ ) satisfies (iii), the single-crossing condition ensures that the local incentive compatibility constraints imply the global incentive compatibility constraints that were neglected in the relaxed problem. Condition (ii) ensures that the agent's utility U s is increasing in his type θ so that the participation constraint for the "least efficient" type θ = 0 implies the participation constraints for all other types that were neglected in the relaxed problem.
The next lemma shows that for the static screening problem to satisfy conditions (i) and (ii), the underlying sequential screening problem must have the property that the family of conditional
is ranked in the sense of first order stochastic dominance (FOSD).
Lemma 3 Let V be given by (20) .
The proof of the lemma follows from a straightforward calculation.
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To relate condition (iii) in Lemma 2 to conditions in the underlying sequential screening model, observe that by (20) and (21), the static virtual surplus Z induced by the sequential screening problem is
Therefore,
where The function φ features prominently in the sequential screening literature because it corresponds to the sequential virtual surplus from trade. Courty and Li (2000) refer to φ as regular if it is increasing in both arguments and they show that together with the condition that {G(x | θ )|θ ∈ Little is known about optimal sequential screening contracts if φ is not regular. 13 Our next two propositions provide new results by treating cases where φ is not necessarily regular. Rather than monotonicity of φ in both arguments, we require monotonicity of φ g in one argument.
14,15
13 See also Battaglini and Lamba (2015) , who argue that in dynamic mechanism design regularity typically fails when types are persistent. (θ )|θ ) = 0, the argument in the previous paragraph goes through unchanged if the condition that φ is increasing in both arguments is replaced by the condition that φ g is increasing in both arguments. Note however that φ being monotone in both arguments does not imply that φ g is monotone in one argument. 15 It is easy to see that our subsequent arguments apply to an even larger class of models-those for which φ crosses zero at most once from below both in direction x and in direction θ . In particular, Proposition 3 (resp. Proposition 4) also hold for the weaker requirement that φ g crosses zero at most once from below in direction θ (resp. x).
The result is an immediate consequence of Theorem 4 in Milgrom and Shannon (1994) which
(θ ) is decreasing so that Lemma 2 applies. But by (42), the condition that Z θ x ≤ 0 is the same as the condition that φ g be increasing in θ . A "typical" shape of φ g is illustrated in the center panel of Figure 2 , where the 0-level set of φ g (resp. of φ) is inverted S-shaped, and x R displays a downward jump.
Our next proposition considers the case that φ g is increasing in x. As illustrated in the right panel of Figure 2 , x s R (θ ) might then not be decreasing in θ , and hence Lemma 2 is not applicable.
If x s R
(θ ) is not decreasing in θ , little is known about how a solution to s in the class of all stochastic trading schedules q s (θ , x) can be obtained. Instead, the literature on static screening restricts attention to finding deterministic solutions to s . In particular, Nöldecke and Samuelson (2007) provide a tractable procedure to find deterministic solutions to static screening problems where the solution to the relaxed problems violates monotonicity. By following their approach, we now show how our equivalence result can be used to identify optimal sequential screening contracts in the class of deterministic sequential screening contracts.
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A schedule q s (θ , x) is deterministic if it corresponds to a degenerate distribution function which places mass 1 on a distinct quantity x s (θ ). Thus, we can identify a deterministic schedule q s (θ , x) with the schedule x s (θ ) of quantities it delivers with probability 1. Within the class of deterministic contracts, an optimal static schedule solves the problem s : max
Following Nöldecke and Samuelson (2007) , let
For a function θ (x) which is (not necessarily strictly) decreasing in x, recall the definition of the generalized inverse:
With this definition, we can express the following result.
16 For other techniques, see Guesenerie and Laffont (1984) , Jullien (2000) , and Toikka (2011) . -ranked, and let φ(θ , x) To see the intuition, note that by (42), φ g being strictly increasing in x means that Z is strictly concave in x for all θ . This implies that the point-wise maximizer x R of Z is the unique solution to the first-order condition Z x (θ , x R (θ )) = φ(θ , x R (θ )) = 0. However, since x R does not need to be decreasing in θ , it is generally no solution to˜ s . In this case, a solution to˜ s displays "bunching", i.e., there are intervals of types θ within which each type trades the same quantity.
For the case that Z is strictly concave in x for all θ , Nöldecke and Samuelson (2007) present a procedure by which the solution can be obtained as the result of an unconstrained optimization problem. 17 The idea is to invert the problem, and instead of looking for an optimal quantity for each type, to look for an optimal type for each quantity. More formally, the inverted problem is
and θ (·) is a solution to˜ We conclude this section with remarks that provide additional insights of our analysis.
Remark 2 Under the conditions of Proposition 3 as well as in the regular case, an optimal contract is deterministic. This is a helpful insight because in general, it is difficult to find an optimal 17 The strict concavity of Z corresponds to Assumption 2 in Nöldecke and Samuelson (2007) . Their other Assumption 1-that the V is quasi-convex in θ for all x-is trivially satisfied in our setting since V θ ≥ 0.
18 To see this, note that for a decreasing function x(θ ) with generalized inverse θ − (x), Fubini's theorem implies: 
sequential screening contract in the class of stochastic contracts (as, e.g., in the case of Proposition 4). The difficulty stems from the fact that the set of incentive compatible sequential screening contracts cannot be easily characterized in terms of monotonicity constraints on the schedule
In particular, the condition that the schedule q d (θ , x) is increasing not only in x but also in θ is not necessary for incentive compatibility. Given our equivalence result, it is not surprising that identical complications arise in static screening models, where, similarly, monotonicity of the stochastic schedule q s (θ , x) in θ is not necessary for incentive compatibility. Indeed, the potential benefit of using stochastic contracts, both in sequential and in static screening, lies precisely in the leeway they provide to relax monotonicity with respect to θ . is, there is no distortion at the top. Second, except at the most efficient type θ = 1, trade does not take place for some ex post valuations x larger than costs c, that is, an optimal contract displays downward distortions. Hence, also under our alternative conditions, the key efficiency properties of optimal sequential screening contracts are qualitatively the same as in the regular case.
Conclusion
We establish a correspondence between sequential screening and static screening models, and show how our equivalence result allows us to solve classes of sequential screening models for which standard sequential screening techniques are not applicable. We also illuminate a number of salient features of the sequential model in the light of their well-understood counterparts in the static model.
